Fuel Subsidy Pass-Through and Market Structure: Evidence from the Renewable Fuel Standard by Lade, Gabriel E. & Bushnell, James
CARD Working Papers CARD Reports and Working Papers
12-2016
Fuel Subsidy Pass-Through and Market Structure:
Evidence from the Renewable Fuel Standard
Gabriel E. Lade
Iowa State University, glade@iastate.edu
James Bushnell
University of California, Davis, jimb@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Economic Policy Commons, Energy Policy Commons, Oil, Gas, and Energy Commons, and the
Public Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CARD Reports and Working Papers at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in CARD Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lade, Gabriel E. and Bushnell, James, "Fuel Subsidy Pass-Through and Market Structure: Evidence from the Renewable Fuel





Fuel Subsidy Pass-Through and Market Structure: 
Evidence from the Renewable Fuel Standard 
 
 
Gabriel E. Lade and James Bushnell 
 
 




Center for Agricultural and Rural Development 
Iowa State University 














Gabriel E. Lade is an assistant professor in the Department of Economics and the Center for Agricultural 
and Rural Development at Iowa State University. E-mail: glade@iastate.edu. 
 
James Bushnell is a professor in the Department Economics at the University of California, Davis. 
 
This publication is available online on the CARD website: www.card.iastate.edu. Permission is granted to 
reproduce this information with appropriate attribution to the author and the Center for Agricultural and 
Rural Development, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011-1070. 
 
We gratefully acknowledge financial support for this research from USDA NIFA Hatch Project Number 
IOW-03909, the Biobased Industry Center at Iowa State University, the Chevron Energy Fellowship at the 
Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California, Davis, NSF EPSCoR Seed Funding, and 
Resources for the Future's Regulatory Policy Initiative. We thank James Stock, Aaron Smith, Bruce 
Babcock, Ivan Rudik, Ben Meiselman, and seminar participants at UC Davis, University of Minnesota 
Applied Economics, and the 2016 AERE Summer Conference for valuable comments. Erix Ruiz 
Mondaca provided excellent research assistance. All errors are our own. 
 
For questions or comments about the contents of this paper, please contact Gabriel Lade, 
glade@iastate.edu. 
 
Iowa State University does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, age, ethnicity, religion, national origin, 
pregnancy, sexual orientation, gender identity, genetic information, sex, marital status, disability, or status as a U.S. 
veteran. Inquiries can be directed to the Interim Assistant Director of Equal Opportunity and Compliance, 3280 
Beardshear Hall, (515) 294-7612. 
Fuel Subsidy Pass-Through and Market Structure:
Evidence from the Renewable Fuel Standard
Gabriel E. Lade∗ and James Bushnell†
December 15, 2016
Abstract
The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) is among the largest renewable energy mandates in the world.
The policy is enforced using tradeable credits that implicitly subsidize biofuels and tax fossil fuels. The
RFS relies on these taxes and subsidies to be passed through to consumers to stimulate demand for
biofuels and decrease demand for gasoline and diesel. Using station-level prices for E85 (a high-ethanol
blend fuel) from over 450 retail fuel stations, we show that pass-through of the ethanol subsidy is, on
average, complete. However, we find that full pass-through takes four to six weeks and that local market
structure of gasoline stations influences both the speed and overall level of pass-through.
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1 Introduction
Cost pass-through and related studies of tax incidence have gained renewed interest among policymakers
and economists with the increasing prevalence of environmental and energy policies that seek to decrease
emissions by regulating upstream firms. The policies leverage the microeconomic principle that when markets
are competitive, economic incidence is independent of statutory incidence. This insight allows policies to
specify a handful of firms as obligated parties rather than regulate thousands of downstream producers or
millions of consumers. In the context of climate change policies, many current and proposed regulations
either explicitly or implicitly tax upstream fossil fuel emissions and subsidize upstream renewable energy
production. Despite the success of these policies crucially hinging on pass-through to downstream users,
little empirical work has studied their impacts on consumer prices to date.
This paper studies pass-through of tradeable compliance credits prices under the U.S. Renewable Fuel
Standard (RFS) to retail E85 prices, a high-ethanol blend fuel. The RFS has been in place for over a decade
and seeks to displace a quarter of the U.S. fuel supply with biofuels by 2022, making it among the largest
and most ambitious renewable energy policies in the world. The RFS is administered using a tradeable
credit system whereby upstream biofuel producers generate credits (known as RINs) in proportion to their
production. RINs must either be produced or purchased by obligated parties, mainly oil refiners and fuel
importers, to comply with the policy. Thus, a binding mandate subsidizes biofuels and taxes gasoline and
diesel in proportion to RIN prices.
While compliance with the RFS in early years was relatively easy, meeting current and future targets is
difficult due to the saturation of ethanol in conventional fuel blends. Regulated parties must sell increas-
ing amounts of high-blend biofuels like E85 that require both adapted vehicles and dedicated distribution
networks to meet future RFS mandates. Thus, the RFS must stimulate demand for fuels like E85 by mak-
ing them sufficiently price competitive to overcome the network barriers currently inhibiting their adoption
(Pouliot and Babcock, 2014). The primary mechanism to achieve this is through pass-through of the up-
stream RIN subsidy to retail prices of fuels blended with biofuels. Put simply, for the RFS to work as
intended, the subsidy value reflected in RINS needs to lower E85 prices sufficiently to spur more widespread
adoption of that fuel.
When markets are competitive, pass-through depends on relative supply and demand elasticities (Jenkin,
1872). Because fuel demand is inelastic while supply is highly elastic, most work studying the RFS assumes
complete pass-through of the upstream costs and subsidies to consumers. Both the overall incidence and
the statutory and economic independence of taxes and subsidies change if markets deviate from perfect
competition (Buchanan, 1969; Weyl and Fabinger, 2013). Imperfect competition may be a concern in our
setting. For RIN subsidies and taxes to affect retail prices, they must be passed through from oil refiners
and biofuel producers, to regional blending terminals, and finally to retail fuel stations. Each of these layers
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of the fuel supply chain has been the subject of both academic and regulatory inquiries for anti-competitive
behavior (Borenstein and Shepard, 2002; Borenstein et al., 2004; Hastings, 2004).1
In this paper, we take advantage of policy-induced variation in historical RIN prices and fluctuations in
historical energy prices to estimate pass-through of the E85 subsidy and wholesale fuel costs to retail E85
prices using data from over 450 fueling stations in Iowa, Illinois, and Minnesota between 2013 and 2016. The
paper has three main findings. First, pass-through is, on average, complete or near complete for all upstream
costs and subsidies. Second, RIN and wholesale fuel cost pass-through exhibit important dynamics, taking
four to six weeks to be complete. Last, market structure of retail fuel stations influences both the level
and speed of pass-through, with stations that have a local monopoly in E85 exhibiting lower and slower
pass-through than stations that have nearby competitors, even after controlling for fixed characteristics of
the stations.
The first finding is significant as previous work has found that pass-through of the RIN subsidy to retail
E85 prices is incomplete (Knittel et al., 2015). In addition, critics of the RFS cite incomplete pass-through
of RINs to wholesale and retail fuel prices as a key policy failure.2 The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) - the enforcing agency - also cites incomplete pass-through as a barrier to expanding ethanol use in
the United States. For example, the Agency included the following language in its proposed rule for the
2017 biofuel standards:
“RIN prices can continue to provide additional subsidies that help to reduce the price of E85
relative to E10 at retail, but the propensity for retail station owners and wholesalers to retain a
substantial portion of the RIN value substantially reduces the effectiveness of this aspect of the
RIN mechanism.”
If RIN pass-through is incomplete, sales of large volumes of E85 may be infeasible and future compliance
costs with the RFS will likely to be higher than currently anticipated. In addition, both the estimated
greenhouse gas benefits and distributional impacts of the policy would be misstated. While we only consider
pass-through to retail E85 prices, our work along with the findings of complete RIN pass-through to wholesale
fuel prices by Knittel et al. (2015) suggests that the market mechanism underlying the RFS is operating as
intended.
1For a list of enforcement actions taken by the Federal Trade Commission with regards to the oil and gas industry, see
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/industry-guidance/oil-and-gas.
2For example, Valero, a large oil refiner and ethanol producer, recently petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency to
redefine the obligated parties under the RFS further downstream at wholesale fuel terminals. The company argued that refiners
should not be obligated parties as they are unable to “affect the amount of renewable fuels blended and sold to consumers”
(Voegele, 2016). The company cites that among the most significant barriers to increasing renewable fuels is limited pass-
through of RINs to consumers. Others, including large investors in oil companies, have predicted RIN markets will cause
refinery bankruptcies and further consolidation in refining capacity due to the burden associated with the RFS falling on
refiners (Krauss, 2016).
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Our second and third findings are broadly consistent with previous literature. Delayed pass-through
of upstream costs is a common finding in retail fuel markets. Previous work has found that pass-through
of upstream oil and wholesale price shocks typically takes four to six weeks, a similar time profile to our
findings (Borenstein et al., 1997; Lewis and Noel, 2011; Lewis, 2011). While we find complete pass-through
on average, we also find significant heterogeneity in pass-through rates across stations consistent with certain
stations exercising market power. In particular, we find that stations that are far from other stations selling
E85 exhibit slower and 25% lower overall pass-through of the RIN subsidy than stations in more contested
retail markets. In addition, we find that stations that are affiliated with large, vertically integrated refining
companies exhibit lower pass-through; however, their pass-through rates are statistically indistinguishable
from non-branded stations as few branded stations offer the fuel.
Our work contributes first to the literature studying market impacts of the RFS. Previous work has
estimated demand for E85 and the role of policy in driving diffusion new alternative fuels (Corts, 2010;
Anderson, 2012; Langer and McRae, 2014; Pouliot and Babcock, 2017). More recent empirical work has
studied RIN cost drivers, as well as the effect of RIN prices on refiners’ markups and profitability (Lade
et al., 2016; Burkhardt, 2016). Most related to our work, Knittel et al. (2015) build on Burkholder (2015),
studying pass-through of the RIN tax and subsidy to wholesale and retail fuel prices. The authors find that
while the implicit tax on gasoline and diesel are fully and immediately passed through to wholesale prices,
little to none of the E85 subsidy is passed through to retail prices. The finding calls into question whether
taxes and subsidies from similar policies are borne by consumers, a near universally assumption in work
studying the distributional and efficiency properties of carbon taxes, new vehicle standards, and gasoline
taxes (Bovenberg and Goulder, 2001; Hassett et al., 2009; Bento et al., 2009; Fullerton and Heutel, 2010;
Grainger and Kolstad, 2010).
Our paper also builds on previous work studying cost pass-through and industry pricing in the energy
sector. Previous work has studied whether supply conditions affect fuel tax incidence (Muehlegger and
Marion, 2011), the incidence of taxation when firms can avoid taxes (Muehlegger et al., 2016), as well as
the distributional impacts of taxes and its interaction retail market structure (Alm et al., 2009; Stolper,
2015). In general, the literature has found that in fossil fuel markets, market power of refineries, wholesale
markets, and retail markets has important interactions with gasoline price dynamics (Borenstein et al., 1997;
Borenstein and Shepard, 2002; Borenstein et al., 2004; Hastings, 2004; Houde, 2012). Less work has examined
the direct impact of upstream compliance credit costs on downstream prices. Fabra and Reguant (2014) and
Hintermann (2016) study pass-through of allowance prices under the European Union’s Emissions Trading
System (EU-ETS) to wholesale electricity prices. Others have used historical variation in upstream energy
costs while taking advantage of cross-sectional and temporal variation in the competitiveness of industries
to study the relationship between pass-through and market structure (Ganapati et al., 2016; Bushnell and
Humber, 2015). While these studies are useful in understanding potential impacts of a carbon tax, they
are unlikely to fully explain the downstream effects of cap and trade programs, intensity standards, and
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fuel mandates due to the inherent volatility of compliance credit prices. Compliance credit markets are
affected by political, regulatory, and economic uncertainty, and these sources have had substantial effects on
compliance credit markets to date.3 As we show, short-run dynamics are important in assessing impacts of
upstream cost shocks on downstream consumers: an increase in the subsidy for E85 is not fully reflected in
retail prices for four to six weeks, and firms that have local market power may not fully pass through the
subsidy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a background on the Renewable Fuel Standard. We
describe key developments in the policy since 2013 and their impacts on RIN markets and the corresponding
value of the subsidy for E85. The section also describes the data used in the subsequent analysis. Section 3
discusses our empirical strategy and presents our results. We also explore the impacts of market structure
on pass-through and discuss some extensions as well as the robustness of our results. We conclude in Section
4 with a discussion of our findings, limitations of the current analysis, and directions for future research.
2 Policy Background and Data Sources
The Renewable Fuel Standard was established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which set modest biofuel
blending mandates for U.S. refiners and fuel importers. The program was expanded in 2007 under the Energy
Independence and Security Act (EISA). EISA significantly increased the 2005 mandates and established sub-
mandates for advanced biofuels,4 biomass-based diesel, and cellulosic ethanol.5 While EISA sets volumetric
biofuel targets, the EPA enforces the policy by setting fractional standards for each biofuel category. Each
year, the EPA divides the final volumetric mandates by projected U.S. gasoline and diesel sales from the
Energy Information Administration. To determine their compliance obligations, refiners and fuel importers
multiply their gasoline and diesel sales by the fractional mandates. Thus, the RFS is a form of an intensity
standard, requiring a minimum fraction of U.S. fuel sales be derived from biofuel.
3Examples of volatility in compliance credit markets following political and economic events include: a sharp run-up
and subsequent collapse in SO2 allowance prices following the initial passage and eventual vacation of new standards for the
pollutant (Hitaj and Stocking, 2016); the fall of EU-ETS allowance prices after regulated parties discovered that permits were
over-allocated in the first phase of the program (Hintermann, 2010; Bushnell et al., 2013); the fall of prices in California’s
market for tradeable credits under its Low Carbon Fuel Standard following court decisions halting the regulation (Yeh et al.,
2016); and volatility in the RFS RINs market following the EPA’s decisions to relax the standards (Lade et al., 2016).
4Biofuels qualify as ‘advanced’ if their life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions are at least 50% below a threshold set by the
EPA.
5The biomass-based diesel and cellulosic ethanol mandates are nested within the advanced biofuel mandate, and the advanced
biofuel mandate is nested within the total biofuel mandate. Thus, every gallon of qualifying cellulosic or biomass-based diesel
fuel counts towards its own mandate, the advanced biofuel mandate, and the total biofuel mandate. Advanced biofuel that does
not qualify as cellulosic biofuel or biomass-based diesel, primarily sugarcane ethanol imported from Brazil, counts towards the
advanced biofuel mandate as well as the total biofuel mandate. All non-advanced biofuels, mainly corn ethanol, counts only
towards the total biofuel mandate.
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The RFS is enforced using a tradeable compliance credit (RIN) mechanism. Figure 1 presents a stylized
depiction of U.S. fuel markets for gasoline and ethanol production and illustrates the operation of RIN
markets. Upstream firms produce gasoline and ethanol. They sell fuel to regional blending terminals before
it is blended and sold to retail stations. Under the RFS, every gallon of qualifying biofuel generates a RIN
that can be sold after the fuel has been blended and sold to consumers. RINs are differentiated by biofuel
type to enforce each sub-mandate. The RINs categories are: (i) D6 RINs, generated mainly by corn ethanol;
(ii) D5 RINs, generated by advanced biofuels; and (iii) D4 RINs, generated by biomass-based diesel.6
To comply with the RFS, refiners must either produce biofuels or purchase RINs in proportion to their
gasoline and diesel sales. At the end of each compliance period, refiners are obligated to the EPA for their
prorated portion of the mandate. For example, suppose the EPA sets a 10% total biofuel mandate with a
2% sub-mandate for advanced biofuel. For every one hundred gallons of gasoline and diesel sold, refiners
must produce or purchase ten RINs, of which at least two RINs must be D5 or D4 RINs. The remaining
eight RINs are allowed to be D6 RINs. Thus, the policy subsidizes biofuels and taxes gasoline and diesel,
where the total value of the subsidy to the biofuel industry equals refiners’ total tax obligation (Lapan and
Moschini, 2012).
Due to technical and regulatory restrictions, ethanol is not blended into gasoline in continuous intervals.
The primary ethanol-gasoline blends sold in the U.S. are E10 (fuel with a 10% ethanol-gasoline blend) and
E85 (fuel with a 51%-83% ethanol-gasoline blend).7 Before 2013 the fuel industry was able to comply cheaply
with the RFS by switching gasoline sold in most markets from E0 (pure gasoline) to E10. By 2013, little E0
was still sold in the U.S. (Energy Information Agency, 2016a).
The 2014 statutory mandates began to require greater volumes of ethanol than could be consumed with
a national E10 blend. This barrier is often referred to as the ‘blend wall.’ The fuel industry has two
primary compliance options to meet the mandates beyond the blend wall. First, the industry can increase
consumption of E85. However, widespread adoption of E85 is hampered by network and coordination issues.
E85 requires both consumers to own special vehicles, known as flex fuel vehicles (FFVs), as well as for
gasoline stations to invest in fueling infrastructure. A second compliance option is to increase blending of
biomass-based diesel, where blending constraints are less binding. Both options are costly and require high
RIN prices. The latter option is expensive due to high feedstock and production costs, while the former
requires E85 prices to be low relative to E10 prices to spur demand, increase investments in FFVs, and
increase the number of stations offering E85. Babcock and Pouliot (2015) argue that E85 could breach the
6Firms also generate D3 RINs by producing cellulosic ethanol. Because little cellulosic ethanol has been produced to date,
the D3 RIN market is relatively illiquid and therefore is not considered in this paper.
7Fuel containing 10.5% to 15% ethanol-gasoline blends (E15) is approved by the EPA for use in vehicles produced after
2001; however, stations selling the fuel must meet a number of requirements including implementing mis-fueling mitigation
plans to prevent older vehicles from using the fuel. Likely due to liability concerns, few stations offer E15 to date, and E15
sales constituted less than 0.5% of all fuel sales in 2015 and 2016 (Energy Information Agency, 2016a).
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blend wall and meet the original RFS mandates. However, doing so would require sustained high RIN prices
being passed-through to E85 prices to stimulate demand for the fuel.
2.1 2014-2016 RFS Mandates and RIN Markets
RINs traded below $0.10/gal before 2013, reflecting the fuel industry’s ability to easily comply with the
mandates by phasing in E10 across the country. In early 2013, as it became apparent that the volumetric
mandates would exceed the blend wall, RIN prices rose rapidly. The EPA responded to concerns about the
potentially harmful impacts of high RIN prices in its 2013 final rule by stating that it would likely set the
2014 mandates below statutory levels. The announcement caused RIN prices to collapse. A subsequent
Reuters article leaked an early version of the 2014 mandates, revealing that the proposed 2014 mandate
level would not only be below statutory levels but below the 2013 mandates. This caused RIN prices to
fall further. The subsequently proposed rule was released in November 2013, at which point RIN markets
bottomed out.8
The 2014 proposed rule set off a prolonged period of stakeholder feedback and regulatory delay. A final
rule was not released until May 2015, when the EPA issued a joint proposal for the 2014, 2015, and 2016
mandates. In the rule, the EPA increased the mandates relative to the proposed rule published in 2013;
however, the levels were lower than the industry expected as evidenced by the sharp decrease in RIN prices
following its release (Irwin and Good, 2015). Subsequently, in November 2015 the EPA finalized the 2014,
2015, and 2016 mandates, increasing the total biofuel requirements slightly from the levels proposed in May
2015. The increases were meaningful, placing the mandates above the blend wall. RIN prices responded to
the rule and increased rapidly. In May 2016, the EPA released its proposed rule for 2017, further increasing
the mandates beyond the blend wall. This again caused RIN prices to rise rapidly, and prices continued to
climb at the end of our observation period.
2.2 RIN Prices and Subsidies
We construct a measure of the net E85 subsidy using prices for D4, D5, and D6 RINs reported by the
Oil Price Information Service (OPIS).9 We first construct the RIN obligation for a gallon of gasoline for
2013 through 2016 using the fractional standards from the 2013 final rule through November 2015 when the
updated final rule was released, the 2015 standards for November through December 2015, and the 2016
standards for January 2016 through June 2016. Letting αi denote the fractional standard for biofuel category
8See Lade et al. (2016) for a more detailed account of the EPA announcements over this period and the effects of the
announcements on RIN prices, commodity markets, and stock prices of publicly traded biofuels firms.
9We follow Burkholder (2015) and Knittel et al. (2015) in constructing our net subsidy measure. However, there are
important differences since we use different empirical specifications.
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i ∈ {D4, D5, D6}, and Pi denote the corresponding RIN price, the tax obligation for every gallon of gasoline
and diesel, τE0, equals:
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τE0 = αD4PD4 + (αD5 − αD4)PD5 + (αD6 − αD5)PD6.
We subtract the biomass-based diesel from the advanced standard and the advanced from the overall standard
to account for the nested structure of the mandates.
Next we construct the ethanol subsidy, which we specify as a negative net tax on ethanol. We assume
that every gallon of ethanol generates a D6 RIN, i.e., is corn ethanol.11 The net tax for each gallon of
ethanol, therefore, equals:
τE100 = −PD6.
Our estimate of the subsidy for E85 depends on: (i) the relative blend rates of ethanol and gasoline in
the fuel; and (ii) whether we assume RINs are passed-through to wholesale fuel prices. Despite its name,
E85 seldom contains as much as 85% ethanol. Blending rates for E85 change seasonally and depend on the
region of the U.S. in which the fuel is sold. The Energy Information Administration estimates that E85
contains anywhere between 51% and 83% ethanol by volume (Energy Information Agency, 2016a). We use
blending standards set by ASTM International to designate the E85 blend rates. ASTM publishes ethanol
content requirements for Summer, Spring/Fall, and Winter blends.12
In our main specification, we include as control variables the wholesale prices of gasoline and ethanol.
Burkholder (2015) argues that wholesale ethanol prices include RINs, i.e. when a party purchases ethanol
using a CME contract they buy both the physical ethanol as well as the RIN credit associated with the fuel
that can be sold once it has been blended and sold to retail stations. Thus, every gallon of E85 generates a
RIN subsidy equal to the blend rate of ethanol in E85 times the RIN price. Knittel et al. (2015) show that
RIN costs are fully and immediately passed through to wholesale gas prices. Thus, we assume that the costs
attributable to the RFS to gasoline are already reflected in wholesale gasoline prices. We, therefore, do not
adjust the subsidy for ethanol in E85 downward by the value of the RIN tax on gasoline in E85, and specify
the net RIN tax for E85 in season j as:
τE85 = BE85,jτE100, (1)
10Under the 2013 standards, αD4 was 1.13%, αD5 was 1.62%, and αD6 was 9.74%. Under the 2015 standards, αD4 was
1.49%, αD5 was 1.62%, and αD6 was 9.52%. Under the 2016 standards, αD4 is 1.59%, αD5 was 2.01%, and αD6 was 10.10%.
Table B.1 in Appendix B provides the volumetric targets of the various revisions to the 2014-2016 mandates.
11The value does not change much if we assume a certain portion of ethanol is advanced ethanol as D5 RINs and D6 RINs
traded closely to one another over the sample period.
12Summer blends (Class 1) are classified by ASTM standards and must contain a minimum 79% ethanol blend. Spring and
Fall (Class 2) blends must contain a minimum 74% ethanol blend. Winter blends (Class 3/4) must contain a minimum 70%
ethanol blend. See Alleman (2011) for more information regarding minimum blending requirements. Volatility class by month
for Iowa, Minnesota, and Illinois are designated using Table E.1 from Department of Energy (2016). Independent testing has
shown that actual blending follows relatively closely to these standards (Alleman, 2011).
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where BE85,j is the ASTM blending standard for E85 in season j.
13 For example, if the RIN price is $1.00
and the ethanol blend rate is 75%, the net RIN tax equals -$0.75/gal.
Figure 3c graphs the subsidy for E85, equal to −τE85, from 2013 to 2016, as well as the timing of the
policy developments discussed in Section 2.1. While the subsidy averaged $0.44/gal, it varied considerably,
ranging from $0.05/gal to over $1.00/gal. The subsidy was especially volatile in the weeks following policy
developments described above. In general, the subsidy decreased following news that moved the expected
mandates below the blend wall and increased following news that moved the expected mandates above it.
Thus, the primary source of variation in the RIN subsidy that we exploit is that induced by the policy
announcements, the timing of which are largely determined by the enacting legislation and requirements
for the EPA to address stakeholder feedback and legal challenges. To the extent that regulatory and legal
considerations determined the timing of the announcements, the historical variation is plausibly exogenous
to local E85 market conditions.
A natural extension to studying E85 subsidy pass-through is to study RIN tax pass-through to regular
gasoline. Most gasoline in the U.S. contains 10% ethanol, with corresponding net tax:
τE10 = (1−BE10)τE0 +BE10τE100,
where BE10 is the E10 blending rate (≈ 10%). The blue dashed line in Figure 3c graphs τE10 over our sample
period. Its mean was -$0.005/gal, providing a slight subsidy for the fuel; however, the net tax was near zero
over the entire period and exhibited little variation. Thus, the implicit tax on gasoline was largely offset by
the subsidy for ethanol, and we, therefore, do not consider E10 tax pass-through in the current study.
2.3 Retail E85 and Wholesale Price Data
Publicly available prices for retail E85 are sparse and mostly available in aggregated series. Knittel et al.
(2015) use a national average retail E85 price reported by AAA. The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Alter-
native Fuels Data Center (AFDC) publishes regional average E85 prices through its Clean Cities Alternative
Fuel Price Report; however, the reports are only published three to four times per year.14 Other crowd-
sourced websites such as E85Prices.com report price data; however, station-level time series are difficult to
13We test the sensitivity of our constructed E85 net tax in three ways. First, we assumed that all E85 contains 74% ethanol
as in Knittel et al. (2015). Second, we estimate specifications in which we assume zero pass-through of RINs to wholesale
gasoline. In this case, the constructed net RIN subsidy equals:
τE85 = (1−BE85,j)τE0 +BE85,jτE100.
Last, in Appendix A.2 we use an instrumental variables strategy to explore potential endogeneity concerns. The IV strategies
would also correct for classical measurement error in the construction of the E85 subsidy measure. Our pass-through estimates
are similar in all instances.
14Reports are available at http://www.afdc.energy.gov/fuels/prices.html.
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construct, the quality of the data are difficult to verify, and coverage of stations in many states is limited
(Jessen, 2015).
We purchased station-level E85 prices from Iowa, Illinois, and Minnesota from OPIS for January 2013
through June 2016. OPIS records daily gasoline prices from over 140,000 stations in the U.S.15 While OPIS
has detailed prices for regular, mid-grade, and premium gasoline, its coverage of retail E85 prices is relatively
sparse. The three states were chosen primarily because coverage of station-level E85 prices is best in the
Midwest. Despite the relatively higher coverage of E85 prices in the region, the data have several limitations.
First, while OPIS reports daily prices, many stations report prices in less frequent intervals. As a result, we
collapse the data to average weekly prices, where stations have less reporting gaps.
In addition, OPIS reports prices for only a subset of E85 stations in the states. The AFDC maintains a
list of E85 stations in the United States.16 As of July 2016, AFDC reported that 2,797 stations offered E85,
of which 735 (over 25%) were in Iowa, Illinois, or Minnesota.17 After restricting the sample to stations that
report prices for more than 16 weeks, our data contain 451 stations, representing over half of the stations
that sell E85 in the region.18 Figure 2 maps the location of the stations included in our analysis in orange
and green along with the locations of all other stations reported as selling E85 by the AFDC. As can be
seen, OPIS’ coverage is relatively balanced geographically. While most of the stations are located in major
metropolitan areas, we also observe many stations in rural locations.
In addition to the RIN subsidy, we include as control variables and study the pass-through of wholesale
ethanol and gasoline costs. We use prompt-month ethanol futures prices from the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change (CME) downloaded from Quandl to control for spot wholesale ethanol costs. To control for wholesale
spot gasoline prices, we use prompt-month New York Harbor RBOB gasoline futures from the Intercontinen-
tal Exchange (ICE). The series are included in our analysis for three reasons. First, the wholesale prices help
to better explain variation in E85 prices over the sample period. Both gasoline and ethanol markets were
volatile between 2013 and 2016, with wholesale gas prices falling from $3.00/gal in 2013 to below $1.50/gal
in late 2014 (Figure 3a). In mid-2014, the ethanol marked experienced a dramatic run-up in price from
below $2.00/gal to above $3.00/gal before falling sharply again by the end of 2014.19 Second, previous work
15Prices are recorded using fleet credit card transactions, direct feeds from stations, and phone surveys.
16See http://www.afdc.energy.gov/fuels/ethanol_locations.html.
17Some groups have raised concerns that the DOE’s coverage of E85 stations is incomplete (Jessen, 2015). This is evidenced
in our data by the presence of 36 of the 451 stations that report E85 prices to OPIS that do not appear in the AFDC list.
The omission of some stations may inhibit our identification of the impact of market structure on pass-through as we use the
reported location of stations from OPIS and AFDC to construct our measures of E85 station density. To our knowledge, the
OPIS and AFDC datasets represent the most complete list of E85 stations.
18In the restricted sample, stations report prices on average for 94 weeks, and 68 stations report prices for more than 130
weeks.
19The ethanol price spike was largely driven by rail supply constraints caused by the ‘polar vortex’ that hit the Midwestern
United States in 2014.
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has found important dynamic responses of retail fuel prices to changes in upstream wholesale fuel prices
(Borenstein et al., 1997). Thus, both contemporaneous and lagged wholesale ethanol and gasoline prices
should affect retail E85 prices. Last, we include wholesale prices as control variables because they affect
RIN values themselves, and are therefore correlated with the E85 subsidy. When RIN price volatility is not
driven by the blend wall or regulatory uncertainty, RIN prices should reflect the expected difference between
the marginal biofuel used to meet each individual mandate and gasoline (or diesel) costs (Lade et al., 2016).
Thus, the wholesale costs control for potential endogeneity of RINs, isolating impacts of the E85 subsidy on
retail prices from changes in upstream wholesale prices.
We construct two measures of retail fuel market structure to study the effects of local competition on
pass-through. The measures are commonly used in the literature studying retail gasoline markets (Hastings,
2004; Stolper, 2015). First, we use an indicator for whether a station is affiliated with a vertically integrated
oil company. These stations typically have arrangements with their affiliated upstream refinery companies
to purchase the company’s fuel directly from refineries or purchase branded fuel from wholesale terminal
markets (Borenstein et al., 2004). In our sample, only two major branded retailers offer E85: BP and
Valero.20 The literature on retail gasoline competition has found that stations compete in highly localized
markets (Houde, 2012; Langer and McRae, 2014). To capture this, our second measure of market structure
is the distance to the nearest competitor station offering E85.
Table 1 and Figure 3 summarize and graph the data used in our analysis. On average, E85 prices were
$2.21/gallon. E85 prices exhibit both substantial spatial and temporal variation, with an average minimum
price of $1.08/gal and a high of $4.17/gal. E85 prices at major branded stations constitute only 7% of the
sample (28 of the 451 stations), but were $0.11/gal higher on average than at unbranded stations. Stations
are on average less than 7 miles away from a competitor that offers E85. However, the distance between
competitors ranges between 0.02 miles to over 100 miles.21
3 Pass-Through to Retail E85 Prices
In this section, we discuss our identification strategy to study pass-through of the E85 subsidy and wholesale
fuel costs to retail E85 prices (Section 3.1). Given inconclusive results from stationarity and cointegration
tests (see Appendix A.1), we use multiple empirical strategies to ensure that our conclusions are not sensitive
to whether the series exhibit a stationary, long-run relationship. Section 3.2 presents our main pass-through
results. We discuss both long-run pass-through and short-run dynamics. Section 3.3 tests whether local
20In addition to major branded stations, our data contain a number of stations affiliated with major retail fuel chains such
as Speedway and Kum and Go. While these stations often have coordinated prices, they do not market gasoline from particular
refiners and are designated as independent.
21Only one station located in north central Minnesota is 100 miles from its nearest competitor. The next furthest distance
is 35 miles. Results are nearly identical if we drop the outlier station.
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market structure impacts pass-through of the subsidy and wholesale fuel costs and Section 3.4 discusses the
implications of our findings.
3.1 Empirical Strategy
With competitive markets and complete pass-through, we would expect E85 to reflect its component whole-
sale fuel costs as well as the RIN subsidy, i.e.,22
Y = α+BE85e+ (1−BE85)g + ρτE85, (2)
where Y is the retail E85 price, α is a markup on wholesale costs to cover taxes, freight, and retailing costs,
e is the wholesale ethanol cost, g is the wholesale gasoline cost, BE85 is the blend rate of ethanol in E85,
τE85 is the E85 net tax, and ρ is the rate of pass-through of the net tax.
Equation (2) is consistent with a data generating process where the E0 RIN tax is already reflected
in wholesale gasoline cost and RINs are separated from wholesale ethanol and sold before E85 is sold to
consumers. In a competitive market, the rate of pass-through, ρ, depends on the relative supply and demand
elasticities of E85. Because FFV owners can fuel with both E10 and E85, most previous work has found that
E85 demand is more elastic than demand for conventional gasoline (Anderson, 2012; Pouliot and Babcock,
2017), suggesting that incomplete pass-through may be expected even in a competitive market outcome.
However, E85 supply constitutes less than 1% of fuel sales in the U.S., and E10 blending drives the vast
majority of ethanol demand in at any wholesale fuel terminal. Thus, wholesale prices are unlikely to be
affected by demand shocks to E85, and supply of the fuel is likely fully elastic over our sample. Perfectly
elastic supply implies that ex-ante, we would anticipate full pass-through (i.e., ρ = 1) if the market for E85
is competitive.
We use two strategies to estimate the pass-through of each variable to retail E85 prices. Both specifications
allow for dynamic adjustment of retail prices to changes in upstream wholesale and subsidy costs. Our main
specification is a cumulative dynamic multiplier (CDM) model given by:
Yit = αi +
L−1∑
j=0
βj∆Xt−j + βLXt−L + γτ + it. (3)
where Yit is the average E85 price at station i in week t, Xt includes the E85 subsidy and wholesale fuel
prices, γτ are year-by-month fixed effects controlling flexibly for seasonality and trends in the price series, and
22Recall that the subsidy is constructed in equation (1) so that negative values represent a subsidy. Thus, a $1.00/gal
increase in τE85 corresponds to a $1.00/gal decrease in the subsidy.
23We could alternatively estimate a model of the form:
Yit = αi +
L∑
j=0
δjXt−j + γτ + it.
In this case, the cumulative pass-through after K periods equals
∑K
j=0 δj . Model (3) represents a more convenient, but
functionally equivalent, method to estimate cumulative pass-through.
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αi are station fixed effects. The coefficients βj are cumulative pass-through rates from X to retail fuel prices
after j ∈ [0, L] periods.23 We also include first-differenced specifications with no station or month-by-year





2Xt−j + βL∆Xt−L + it. (4)
As before, the coefficients βj equal the cumulative pass-through after j periods. Thus, if pass-through is
complete after J weeks, we would expect βJ to equal the weights from equation (2) for each price series.
Because economic theory suggests that a long-run relationship should exist between retail E85 prices and
its upstream costs, we also estimate a panel dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) model of the form:
Yit = αi + βXt +
p∑
j=−p
δj∆Xt−j + γτ + it. (5)
where Yit and Xt are defined as before. If the series are cointegrated, the coefficients β from equation (5)
estimate the long-run relationship between retail E85 prices, the E85 subsidy, and the upstream wholesale
fuel costs (Stock and Watson, 1993; Kao and Chiang, 2000; Mark and Sul, 2003). Alternatively, we could
estimate a panel error correction model that is similar to the first differences specification but with an
additional ‘error correction’ term measuring the long-run relationship between the four series. We prefer the
DOLS model as both interpretation and estimation is simpler.24
Note that while Yit are station-level prices, all variables Xt are national prices. Thus, if stations respond
similarly to changes in national average values of Xt, panel-robust standard errors clustered at the station
would overstate our inference. Heteroskedasticity is especially important in our setting because some large
retail chains appear to use centralized pricing strategies. As such, we estimate two-way clustered standard
errors at the station and year-by-month to allow for both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the
residuals.25
The specifications above assume that contemporaneous and lagged RIN and wholesale market prices are
exogenous to E85 prices, conditional on our control variables. The estimates are biased if Xt are correlated
with the error term it. We believe this is not a significant concern. After controlling for seasonality and
trends in the levels specification, or when using the first differences specification, the primary source of
variation in RIN prices are policy developments changing industry expectations of whether the mandates
will be above or below the blend wall. Wholesale gasoline prices are largely determined by upstream oil
prices that are set on the world market. National and international markets largely determine wholesale
ethanol prices, which are principally governed by feedstock supply conditions. Given that E85 constitutes a
small share of both the ethanol and gasoline market (<1%), local demand conditions for E85 are unlikely to
affect either national price series. Appendix A.2 presents results using an instrumental variables strategy,
and results are similar – though noisier – to the specifications shown here.
24Results are largely similar with the panel error correction model.
25We also explored clustering at the corporation and year-by-month. Our results are not sensitive to the change.
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3.2 Subsidy, Ethanol, and Gasoline Cost Pass-Through
Table 2 provides our pass-through estimates of the E85 subsidy, wholesale ethanol, and wholesale gasoline
to retail E85 prices. The CDM models present pass-through estimates after six and eight weeks. To be
included in the analysis, a station must report price data for L + 1 consecutive weeks to estimate equation
(3) and for 2P + 1 consecutive weeks to estimate equation (5). Thus, our sample size varies depending on
the specification as well as the number of lags included in the analysis.
Column (1) presents estimates from a simple OLS model using only the level of contemporaneous prices
with station fixed effects. If the series are cointegrated, OLS consistently estimates the long-run relationship
between the series. The estimates suggest that just over half of the RIN subsidy is passed through to
retail prices, while a $1/gal increase in wholesale ethanol (gasoline) costs increase E85 prices by $0.58/gal
($0.42/gal). While the wholesale cost coefficients are consistent with ethanol having a larger impact on E85
prices than gasoline, they do not reflect the relative blending ratio of each fuel.
Results from the DOLS model with four first-differenced lags and leads of the dependent variables are
presented in column (2). The estimates suggest a higher pass-through of the E85 subsidy of 76%, and the null
hypothesis of complete pass-through cannot be rejected at the 5% level (p-value=0.04). The wholesale ethanol
and gasoline coefficients imply blend rates of 84% and 27% for ethanol and gasoline, respectively, closer to
their expected values. However, DOLS estimates vary for different specifications of the first-differenced lags
and leads, suggesting that other methods may be more appropriate.26
Columns (3)-(6) present pass-through estimates from our CDM model. Columns (3) and (4) present the
estimated pass-through rates after six and eight weeks, respectively, for the levels specification with year-
by-month and station fixed effects, and columns (5) and (6) present results for the first-differenced model.
Estimates for the subsidy pass-through range between 84% and 116% and no specification rejects the null
hypothesis of complete pass-through. The results suggest that, on average, pass-through is near complete
to overfull. Overfull pass-through is not an entirely anomalous result and has been found in fuel markets
previously (Burkhardt, 2016; Stolper, 2015). When markets are imperfectly competitive, overfull pass-
through arises if demand is sufficiently convex (Seade, 1985; Weyl and Fabinger, 2013). Specifications that
estimate pass-through in first-differences, the most common empirical specification in the oil and wholesale
gasoline pass-through literature, estimate pass-through rates below, but near, 100%.
In all CDM specifications, estimated coefficients on wholesale ethanol and gasoline costs are reflective of
the relative blend rates of ethanol and gasoline in E85. Point estimates correspond to a $1.00/gal increase in
wholesale ethanol costs leading to between a $0.63/gal and $0.81/gal increase in E85 prices, and a $1.00/gal
increase in wholesale gasoline costs increase E85 prices between $0.34/gal and $0.39/gal. All specifications
26Estimated pass-through using one to eight first-differenced leads and lags of X range between 67% and 86% for the E85
subsidy, 70% and 97% for wholesale ethanol, and 21% and 35% for wholesale gasoline.
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reject the null hypothesis of no pass-through, and a test of the hypothesis that the coefficients on ethanol
and gasoline sum to unity cannot be rejected for any specification.
Estimated pass-through rates for all variables are lower after six weeks than eight weeks, suggesting that
prices may be slow to react to upstream cost changes. To explore this further, Figure 6 graphs the cumulative
pass-through rates of each series for both CDM specifications. Week 0 corresponds to the week in which a
one-time, $1.00/gal cost shock occurs. For the E85 subsidy, this corresponds to a $1.00/gal decrease in the
E85 subsidy.
E85 prices do not respond to the initial shock for any of the three variables, and we cannot reject the
null hypothesis of zero pass-through for many specifications in week 0. Retail prices begin to increase on
average within one week following each cost shock; however, the E85 subsidy and ethanol costs are not
entirely passed through for four to six weeks after the shock occurs. In contrast, pass-through of a wholesale
gasoline cost shock is relatively quick, taking only one to two weeks.
The delayed pass-through of the subsidy and wholesale ethanol costs conforms with previous studies of
retail fuel price responses to oil and wholesale gasoline price shocks. For example, Borenstein et al. (1997)
find that oil price increases take three to four weeks to pass-through to retail fuel prices, with oil price
decreases taking longer to be pass-through than oil price increases.27 Lewis and Noel (2011) and Lewis
(2011) find that retail prices take between four and eight weeks to adjust to wholesale gasoline cost shocks
depending on the competitiveness of the wholesale markets.
Our findings suggest that E85 sold at stations in our sample is, on average, priced competitively and
fully reflects upstream wholesale fuel costs and the E85 subsidy. The finding supports the notion that price
impacts from energy and environmental regulations on upstream firms affect consumer prices. However,
the long delays in pass-through rates may be indicative of firms exercising market power in the face of
costly supply adjustments (Borenstein and Shepard, 2002), a feature that may have important impacts on
the efficiency and cost of market-based regulations. To explore further heterogeneity in pass-through rates
at retail stations, we estimate pass-through of each variable as a function of our measures of local market
structure.
3.3 Pass-Through and Local Market Structure
Market power may affect both the overall level and speed of pass-through. To explore this, we interact X in
the first-differenced CDM model, equation (4), with indicator variables that proxy for imperfect competition:
(i) whether a station is affiliated with a major, vertically integrated refining company; and (ii) the distance
between a station and its nearest competitor offering E85. For ease of interpretation, we create two indicator
27In Appendix A.2 we explore potential asymmetric pass-through and find that asymmetries do not play a major role in our
setting.
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variables for the latter effect of whether a station is greater than 5 or 10 miles from its nearest competitor.
We present results here for the CDM model in first differences only; however, results are similar for the levels
specification with year-by-month fixed effects. As before, we first consider cumulative pass-through after six
and eight weeks.
Table 3 presents our results. Average pass-through estimates for ‘competitive’ stations are similar to our
previous findings, with complete pass-through of the E85 subsidy as well as ethanol and gasoline wholesale
costs being passed through at their approximate blend rates. Branded major stations have lower estimated
pass-through rates of the E85 subsidy of $0.06/gal and $0.02/gal after six and eight weeks, respectively. We
also estimate that branded stations have lower pass-through rates of wholesale ethanol costs, but almost no
difference in gasoline cost pass-through. In all instances, the estimated pass-through differences for branded
stations is statistically indistinguishable from non-branded stations. The result is not surprising given that
few branded stations offer the fuel.
Columns (3)-(6) present results for stations that are further than 5 and 10 miles from other stations
offering E85. Consider first the subsidy pass-through. Stations that are farther from other E85 stations
have large and statistically significantly lower estimated E85 subsidy pass-through after six weeks. The
average differences are greater for stations that are more than 10 miles from other stations ($0.27/gal lower)
than for stations that are greater than 5 miles from another station ($0.14/gal). The differences in subsidy
pass-through persist even after eight weeks; however, the difference is not statistically significant for stations
greater than 5 miles from the nearest station. Stations that are more than 10 miles from a competitor
continue to have 23% lower subsidy pass-through after eight weeks, suggesting sustained lower pass-through
at stations with local market power.
Stations farther from competitors do not exhibit differential pass-through of wholesale gasoline costs,
however, they have lower estimated pass-through of ethanol costs. Thus, E85 prices at stations in rural
locations on average have lower estimated pass-through rates of both the E85 subsidy and wholesale ethanol
costs. In all cases, however, the differential pass-through of wholesale ethanol costs is lower than the decreased
pass-through rate of the E85 subsidy. Thus, on average, stations that are farther from competitors have
higher estimated E85 prices even after controlling for fixed characteristics of the station such as the distance
to a wholesale fuel terminal.
Figures 5a - 5f graph the estimated pass-through rates over time for each variable for unbranded versus
branded stations in the left column, as well as for stations that are less than and greater than 10 miles from
their nearest competitor in the right column. Stations that are branded and have higher local market power
in E85 have slower estimated pass-through over time. The exception is in gasoline, where pass-through rates
are similar. Estimated pass-through of the E85 subsidy and wholesale ethanol costs is low one to two weeks
after a cost shock for branded stations, after which estimated pass-through rates are similar. Stations that
are greater than 10 miles from their nearest competitor have lower and slower estimated pass-through of
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both the E85 subsidy and wholesale ethanol costs, consistent with previous studies of the impact of market
power on oil cost pass-through.
In addition to our panel data estimator, we estimate station-level pass-through rates for individual




βj∆Xt−j + βLXt−L + γτ + it, ∀i.
Given sample size limitations, particularly for stations with less frequent price reports, we are only able to
reliable estimate pass-through rates for a subset of stations. In particular, we estimate pass-through for
stations that we observe for more than 25 weeks, and that report prices for at least seven consecutive weeks.
After dropping all stations that do not satisfy this criterion as well as stations for which the estimated
standard errors are very large, we are left with 163 station-specific pass-through estimates.28 For ease of
exposition, we truncate the few negative estimated pass-through rates at zero and the few high pass-through
rates at 1. Thus, pass-through rates equal to 1 represent full to overfull pass-through.
Given the focus of the paper, we present pass-through results for the E85 subsidy only here. Figures
6a-6c graph the station-level pass-through rates after six weeks and provide histograms of the pass-through
rates for each state. In all three states, the distribution of the subsidy pass-through is bimodal, with most
stations exhibiting either little to negative pass-through or full to overfull pass-through. The distribution is
skewed left for all three states, with the mass of stations exhibiting full or overfull pass-through. Consistent
with our market-power results, stations in rural areas tend to exhibit lower pass-through rates while stations
in metropolitan areas exhibit higher pass-through rates.
In addition, we graph stations’ estimated subsidy pass-through in all three states as a function of charac-
teristics of the local fuel market. Figure 7 graphs the estimated subsidy pass-through rate after six weeks as
a function of: (i) whether the station is branded or unbranded; (ii) the distance between stations and their
nearest competitor;29 (iii) the population density of the county in which the station is located; and (iv) the
median home value of the county in which the station is located. The figures graph raw correlations between
the subsidy pass-through and the market measures as well as best-fit lines.
In general, the pass-through rates are consistent with a model in which retailers with markets power
exhibit lower pass through. Stations that are farther from competitors have lower pass through. Stations
that are branded and affiliated with a large, vertically integrated refinery have lower average pass-through
rates. Similar to Stolper (2015), we estimate that subsidy pass-through is higher in areas in which proxies
for local customer wealth are higher. Specifically, pass-through is higher in counties that are more densely
populated and in counties with higher median home values.
28Note that our main results are not driven by the stations with less reliable reporting as evidenced by results in Table B.4.
The restricted sample of stations that report greater than two years are the same stations we can reliably estimate station-level
pass-through rates for.
29Because the distance between stations changes over time with the entrance of new stations offering E85, we present the
pass-through rates as a function of the average distance between the stations.
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3.4 Discussion and Robustness
Figure 8 summarizes our findings graphically. The figure graphs the average retail taxes for E85 along with
our estimated wholesale gasoline (blue) and ethanol (orange) cost components of E85. The black line is the
average retail E85 price for all stations in our data, and the red line adjusts the average retail prices upward
by the value of the RIN subsidy. When we do not account for the subsidy, average retail margins over the
sample are -$0.09/gal, with sustained losses from selling E85 from 2015-2016. Once we account for the value
of the RIN subsidy, however, average retail margins increase to $0.33/gal, in line with conventional retail
margin estimates from selling other fuels. Thus, we can rationalize historical E85 prices only if we allow for
pass-through of the E85 subsidy. Also apparent in the figure is the lagged adjustment of the retail price
series to sharp changes in wholesale costs, with our estimated margins shrinking towards zero following cost
shocks and increasing slowly after.
We explore the robustness of our regression results in Appendix A.2 in a number of ways. First, we
consider whether pass-through rates have changed over time. RIN markets and E85 fuel are relatively new
additions to the transportation fuel sector. In contrast to fuel tax changes that are discrete and known in
advance of when they are enacted, upstream subsidies and taxes from the RFS have been volatile since 2013.
This feature of RIN markets increases the complexity of marketing arrangements between firms and may
cause pass-through rates in early years to differ from more recent years. However, we find little evidence
that pass-through rates differ in the first versus the second half of our sample. Our results are robust to a
number of other specifications, including limiting our attention to stations that report prices more reliably
and using a variety of instrumental variables strategies.
We also explore reasons for the differences between our findings and those by Knittel et al. (2015) in
Appendix A.3. Overall, we find that the primary reasons that we find full pass-through of the RIN subsidy
while Knittel et al. (2015) find little to no pass through are: (i) the number of lags considered; (ii) the
extended sample period used in this study; and (iii) the empirical specification. The most important point
appears to be the latter: allowing for lagged adjustment of retail E85 prices to both upstream wholesale
costs and RIN values substantially increases our estimated long-run pass-through rate.
4 Conclusions
Through the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), the U.S. Government has set aggressive goals for the expansion
of alternative fuels in the U.S. transportation sector. Because of technical limits on the blending of ethanol
with conventional fuel, meeting these RFS requirements will require an increase in the consumption of both
E85 and biodiesel. Increasing demand for E85 has therefore become a major policy objective of both the EPA
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Both Agencies have primarily focused on improving E85 fueling
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infrastructure.30 Given current limits in the number of pumps and vehicles capable of consuming E85,
along with its lower energy content, increasing demand for the fuel almost certainly require a persistently
high RIN value and a coincident reduction in the relative cost of E85 to E10 (Babcock and Pouliot, 2013,
2015). However, policy-makers and industry have raised concerns that the value of RIN subsidies is not being
reflected in retail prices, thereby threatening the price-based mechanism through which ethanol consumption
was to be expanded by the RFS.
Using detailed, station-level data, we find that, contrary to this perception, retail E85 prices do in fact,
on average, fully reflect upstream subsidies and wholesale fuel costs. As with previous studies of the effects
of wholesale gasoline and oil cost shocks, however, we find important deviations from competitive pricing at
some stations. In particular, we find that the long-run subsidy pass through to E85 is lower at stations that
likely have market power in selling the fuel. In addition, pass-through of both the E85 subsidy and wholesale
fuel costs is delayed significantly, taking on average four to six weeks to be complete.
Despite the storability of fuel, delayed pass-through of upstream wholesale costs is a common finding
in the literature. The literature has proposed a number of explanations for the presence of such delays.
Borenstein and Shepard (2002) find that delayed pass-through is consistent with a model with costly supply
adjustment and market power. If refiners and biofuel plants are unable to change their production schedules
immediately in response to changes in RIN or wholesale price changes, prices will respond slowly over time as
production adjusts to reach a new equilibrium. Other authors have presented competing theories to explain
delayed adjustment including costly consumer search (Johnson, 2002) and the presence of menu costs (Davis
and Hamilton, 2004).
While we are unable to distinguish between competing explanations for lagged adjustment of E85 prices,
all carry equity implications. Given the large fluctuations in RIN values, even short delays in pass-through
leave room for upstream firms to capture significant rents. In addition, the lower pass-through estimates
after eight weeks among firms that are greater than 10 miles from their nearest competitor suggests that
some stations can charge persistently higher E85 prices. Thus, more research is necessary to determine both
the reasons for and the sources of market power as it relates to the RFS.
While complete pass-through does not alone imply that E85 meet the future RFS2 obligations, our work
along with the work by Pouliot and Babcock (2017) that shows that demand for E85 is highly elastic when
it is priced to be less expensive than E10 on an energy equivalence basis implies that the market mechanism
underlying the RFS is operating as intended in the enacting legislation. However, market power does appear
to play a role in RIN pass-through, which may limit the effectiveness of such policies, particularly as E85
pumps expand to areas where the technology is relatively new and few stations offer the fuel. As such, more
work is needed to improve data collection of alternative fuel prices and sales to gain a better understanding
30In 2015 the USDA announcing a $130 million Biofuel Infrastructure Partnership program with the explicit goal of expanding
high-ethanol blending pumps.
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of pricing dynamics as well as public demand for these new fuels. In addition, further studies of pass-through
from environmental and energy policies are necessary to understand the efficiency and distributional impacts
of such policies more completely.
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5 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
E85 ($/gal) 2.21 0.56 1.08 4.17 29,938
Major Branded 2.32 0.58 1.24 3.56 1,991
E85 Subsidy ($/gal) -0.44 0.16 -1.10 -0.05 29,938
RBOB ($/gal) 2.06 0.70 0.95 3.15 29,938
Ethanol ($/gal) 1.81 0.40 1.32 3.24 29,938
Branded Major Station 0.07 0.25 0 1 29,938
Minimum Distance to Rival (miles) 6.86 8.68 0.02 103.23 29,938
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Table 2: E85 Subsidy Pass-Through
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
E85 Subsidy ($/gal) 0.527*** 0.764*** 1.082*** 1.164*** 0.844*** 0.940***
(0.119) (0.111) (0.183) (0.188) (0.115) (0.119)
Ethanol ($/gal) 0.583*** 0.840*** 0.745*** 0.816*** 0.633*** 0.731***
(0.156) (0.107) (0.078) (0.087) (0.070) (0.077)
Gasoline ($/gal) 0.419*** 0.273*** 0.343*** 0.334*** 0.367*** 0.381***
(0.073) (0.056) (0.114) (0.113) (0.089) (0.097)
Observations 29,938 15,880 18,722 16,772 17,713 15,913
Model OLS DOLS CDM CDM CDM CDM
Specification Level Level Level Level FD FD
Lags (Weeks) N/A N/A 6 8 6 8
Station FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
YearXMonth FE No No Yes Yes No No
The dependent variable is the retail E85 price ($/gal). The DOLS regressions include four leads and lags
of the first-difference of the dependent variables. The CDM columns present estimates of the cumulative
dynamic multipliers for each variable after the number of lagged periods specified in the bottom panel.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at the station and year-by-month.
*, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
26
Table 3: E85 Subsidy Pass-Through and Market Structure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
E85 Subsidy ($/gal) 0.849*** 0.941*** 0.915*** 0.992*** 0.913*** 0.999***
(0.113) (0.119) (0.104) (0.118) (0.111) (0.121)
× (Branded Major) -0.066 -0.020
(0.115) (0.121)
× (> 5 mi. to E85 Station) -0.141** -0.101
(0.054) (0.063)
× (> 10 mi. to E85 Station) -0.274*** -0.234***
(0.062) (0.059)
Ethanol ($/gal) 0.637*** 0.735*** 0.700*** 0.781*** 0.669*** 0.767***
(0.072) (0.079) (0.074) (0.091) (0.073) (0.083)
× (Branded Major) -0.063 -0.053
(0.070) (0.091)
× (> 5 mi. to E85 Station) -0.135*** -0.098**
(0.034) (0.041)
× (> 10 mi. to E85 Station) -0.155*** -0.150**
(0.047) (0.062)
Gasoline ($/gal) 0.365*** 0.382*** 0.362*** 0.373*** 0.364*** 0.377***
(0.090) (0.099) (0.092) (0.104) (0.090) (0.099)
× (Branded Major) 0.017 -0.010
(0.046) (0.043)
× (> 5 mi. to E85 Station) 0.008 0.016
(0.029) (0.039)
× (> 10 mi. to E85 Station) 0.005 0.018
(0.033) (0.039)
Observations 17,713 15,913 17,705 15,880 17,713 15,913
Model CDM CDM CDM CDM CDM CDM
Specification FD FD FD FD FD FD
Lags (Weeks) 6 8 6 8 6 8
The dependent variable is the first difference of the retail E85 price ($/gal). (Branded Major) is an indicator variable for
whether a station is affiliated with a large, vertically integrated oil company. (> 5 mi. to E85 Station) and (> 10 mi. to
E85 Station) are indicator variables that equal one if the closest rival station selling E85 is more than 5 or 10 miles away.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at the station and year-by-month. *, **, ***
denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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Figure 2: E85 Stations in Iowa, Illinois, and Minnesota
Note: The figure graphs the location of all E85 stations reported by the Department of Energy’s Alternative Fuel Data Center
(AFDC) and OPIS from 2013-2016. Black hollow diamonds represent stations reported as selling E85 by the AFDC, orange
diamonds represent stations that report E85 prices to OPIS and are in the AFDC database, and green circles represent stations
that report E85 prices to OPIS but are not in the AFDC database.
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Figure 3: Wholesale Fuel Prices, E85 Prices and the E85 subsidy
(a) Wholesale Gasoline Prices (b) Wholesale Ethanol Prices
(c) E85 Implicit Subsidy and E0 Implicit Tax (d) Average E85 Prices (IA, IL, MN)
Note: Figures 3a and 3b graph wholesale gasoline prices and ethanol prices in the U.S. from 2013-2016. Figure 3c graphs the
value of the E85 subsidy for E85 in red (solid line), the value of the E0 RIN tax in blue (dashed line), and the timing of key
RFS policy developments between 2013 and 2016. Figure 3d graphs the mean, 5th percentile, and 95th percentile of the E85
prices in our sample of stations.
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Note: The figure graphs the average speed with which a shock to the upstream E85 subsidy, wholesale ethanol price, and
wholesale gasoline price are reflected in retail E85 prices. Estimates are presented using two empirical specifications: (i) a
first-differenced CDM model and a CDM model with all variables specified in levels with year-by-month and station fixed
effects. All cost shocks occur in week 0.
Figure 5: Pass-Through of Upstream Costs to Retail E85 Prices and Local Market Structure
(a) E85 Subsidy: Branded vs. Non-Branded (b) E85 Subsidy: Distance to Rival
(c) Wholesale Ethanol: Branded vs. Non-Branded (d) Wholesale Ethanol: Distance to Rival
(e) Wholesale Gasoline: Branded vs. Non-Branded (f) Wholesale Gasoline: Distance to Rival
Note: The figure graphs the average speed with which a shock to the upstream E85 subsidy, wholesale ethanol price, and
wholesale gasoline price are reflected in retail E85 prices broken out by two measures of market structure: (i) whether stations
are branded (left column); and (ii) whether stations are close or far from their nearest rival (right column). Cost shocks occur
in week 0.




Note: The figures graph station-level pass-through estimates for the E85 subsidy as well as the density of E85 subsidy pass-
through estimates in each state. Estimated pass-through rates are truncated at zero and one.
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Figure 7: Station-Level E85 Subsidy Pass-Through and Local Market Structure
Note: The figure graphs raw correlations and best fit lines for station-level 6 week pass-through estimates and for measures of
local market structure including: (i) the distance of the station from its nearest competitor; (ii) whether the station is affiliated
with a major, vertically integrated oil company (i.e., branded); (iii) the population density of the county in which the station
is located; and (iv) the median home value of the county in which the station is located.
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Figure 8: Average E85 Margins
Note: The figure graphs the average E85 margins for all stations in our sample from 2013-2016. When we do not adjust retail




A.1 Unit Root and Cointegration Tests
Testing whether retail E85 prices are stationary requires selecting a panel unit root test. A number of sta-
tionarity and cointegration tests are available. Many use variations of an augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
test (Levin et al., 2002; Im et al., 2003), while others use residual-based Lagrange multiplier tests (Hadri,
2000). The appropriateness of each test in a given empirical setting depends on the relative speeds of asymp-
totic convergence between the cross-sectional and time series observations, whether one assumes common or
heterogeneous coefficients on the lagged independent variable, and whether the panel is balanced. Similar
issues arise when determining whether panel data is cointegrated with other price series. A more practical
matter guides our choice of a stationarity test for the retail E85 price data: our panel has gaps and is un-
balanced. The most practical unit root test is the Fisher-type test proposed by Choi (2001) that combines
p-values from individual ADF tests for every station in our sample.
Table B.2 reports the unit root test results for all of the price series used in our analysis. For E85 prices,
we report three unit root test statistics: (i) a Fisher inverse chi-squared test that combines the p-values
from station-level unit root tests; (ii) a Fisher test that subtracts the cross-sectional means from all E85
price series; and (iii) a summary of the percent of station-level ADF tests that are rejected at the 5% level.
We also present approximate p-values for ADF tests on the E85 subsidy, the wholesale ethanol, and the
wholesale gasoline price series. For every test, we include two, four, and six lags.
Results from the stationarity tests yield mixed conclusions regarding whether the E85 price series contain
a unit root. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that every E85 price panel contains a unit root when we
include a trend in the Fisher test, but can reject the null hypothesis with two and four lags when we control
for cross-sectional correlation between E85 prices and demean the series. The null hypothesis of a unit root
in each station’s E85 prices is only rejected for around 5% of our stations, suggesting that a few extreme
series may be driving the sensitivity of the panel unit root tests. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the E85 subsidy or wholesale gasoline price series contain a unit root but can reject the null hypothesis of a
unit root for wholesale ethanol at a 10% level when we include two and four lags.
We also report the average rejection rates when we conduct station-by-station Engle-Granger tests of
cointegration between each station’s E85 prices, the RIN subsidy, and the wholesale fuel costs. When
we include two and four lags, only about 5% of the station-level tests reject the null hypothesis of no
cointegration. When we include six lags, less than 1% of the Engle-Granger tests are rejected. Thus, while
the prices appear to contain a unit root, we do not have strong evidence that many of the stations’ prices
exhibit a long-run relationship with the E85 subsidy or wholesale fuel costs. Despite this, economics theory
suggests that a long-run relationship should hold, and the result is likely driven by the relatively short time
span over which we observe the prices and the long time it takes for series to reach a new equilibrium given
the estimated delayed adjustment to upstream cost shocks.
36
A.2 Robustness
We explore the robustness of our results in a number of ways. First, we examine the evolution of pass-through
rates over time. Second, our results may be sensitive if price reports to OPIS are endogenous, i.e., if those
stations that regularly report prices have systematically higher pass-through than stations that report prices
less frequently. We test this by splitting our sample to examine whether stations with less frequently reported
prices have lower pass-through than stations that regularly report prices. Third, we use two instrumental
variables strategies to test the sensitivity of our results to concerns regarding the endogeneity of the RIN
subsidy and wholesale fuel costs. Fourth, given previous findings in the literature, we explore whether
pass-through of each upstream costs is asymmetric. Our results are robust to all concerns.
Evolution of Pass-Through Over Time. To test whether pass-through rates have changed over time,
we estimate equation (3) separated for the first and second half of our sample. Table B.3 presents estimated
pass-through rates for the first-differenced CDM model after six and eight weeks. Results are largely similar
for the first and second half of the sample, suggesting that fuel markets had already incorporated RINs into
retail prices in early periods.31 When we study pass-through over time, E85 prices responded quickly to
changes in RIN prices in the second half of the sample. However, point estimates of the subsidy pass-through
are nearly identical four to five weeks after the cost shock.
Pass-Through and Stations’ Price Reporting Frequency. The data from OPIS have some limi-
tations. Among the greatest concerns is that some stations report E85 prices to OPIS sporadically. OPIS
collects price data through a combination of fleet credit card swipes, phone surveys, and direct station feeds.
Our results may be biased if fleets are more likely to fill up when E85 prices are lowest or if stations report
E85 prices when sales are highest. In addition, our market power results may be biased if rural stations
report prices less frequently than urban stations and their reporting is correlated with E85 prices.32 To
test this, Tables B.4 and B.5 present estimation results of pass-through and the interaction of local market
structure with pass-through separately for stations that report more than 2 years of E85 price data and
stations that report less than two years of price data.
Average pass-through rates of the E85 subsidy are higher for stations that report more than two years
of data, particularly after six weeks. However, the estimated results are statistically indistinguishable for
the two samples, and pass-through rates of ethanol and gasoline wholesale costs do not suggest any systemic
bias between stations that report more or fewer price data. The market power results are slightly more
31The one exception is with estimated pass-through of wholesale ethanol costs. Estimated pass-through of wholesale ethanol
costs in the second half of the sample are higher, and the point estimates have much larger standard errors. The result is driven
by relatively stable wholesale ethanol prices over the second half of our sample, as shown in Figure 3b.
32Our primary specifications partially address these concerns by controlling for fixed differences between stations that report
more and less than others. Despite this, stations that report prices less frequently may be systematically different than those
that report prices more often in ways that vary over our sample period.
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sensitive to splitting the data by number of price reporting weeks. In both cases, estimated E85 subsidy
pass-through rates are slightly higher for branded stations; however, the coefficients are identified off of even
fewer branded stations than in the main specification. The coefficients on the indicator for whether stations
are five or ten miles from their nearest competitor offering E85 are largely similar to the previous results,
with the exception that we estimate that stations reporting less than two years of data that are greater than
five miles from their nearest competitor do not have different subsidy pass-through rates than stations less
than five miles from their competitor. As previously, similar results for the E85 subsidy pass-through hold
for wholesale ethanol costs; however, wholesale gasoline costs do not appear to differ systematically based
on the market power measures.
Instrumental Variables. A threat to identification is endogeneity of the E85 subsidy, wholesale ethanol,
and wholesale gasoline prices. Consistent estimation of equations (3)-(5) requires that all the variables Xt
and their lagged values are exogenous to the error term, i.e., E(it|Xt,Xt−1,Xt−2, · · · ) = 0. The assumption
is violated if contemporaneous and historical RIN prices and wholesale fuel costs are correlated with local
E85 demand conditions.
To address this, we use two instrumental variables strategy to assess the robustness of our results to such
concerns. First, we assume that only contemporaneous values ofXt are endogenous, i.e., E(it|Xt−1,Xt−2, · · · ) =
0. In this case, short-run E85 demand shocks may be correlated with contemporaneous RIN and wholesale
market prices; however, they are not correlated with lagged prices. Second, we assume all current and lagged
values of X are endogenous.
To instrument for wholesale gasoline prices, we use weekly average prompt-month CME Brent crude oil
futures contract prices downloaded from Quandl. Brent crude oil serves as a benchmark price for world crude
oil and is therefore not affected by market conditions in the U.S. Midwest. To instrument for U.S. wholesale
ethanol prices, we use weekly average prompt-month futures prices for number 11 sugar, the benchmark
world price for raw sugar. The relevance of the instrument comes from the connection between ethanol
imports from Brazil and world sugar prices. Brazilian ethanol has played a volatile but important role in
U.S. ethanol markets, with almost all imports of ethanol into the U.S. coming from the country (Energy
Information Agency, 2016b). Given the small share of E85 in the U.S., supply condition in the U.S. are
unlikely to affect worldwide sugar markets. Because ethanol in Brazil is produced from sugarcane, however,
ethanol imports from the country decrease as world sugar prices increase and opportunity costs of shifting
sugarcane into sugar production increases. Recent high world sugar prices have been cited as a key factor
driving U.S. biofuel producers to export ethanol to Brazil as sugarcane ethanol plants production has fallen
(Prentice and Ewing, 2016).
Last, we use indicator variables for the week of and up to three weeks following key policy developments
in the RFS to instrument for the ethanol subsidy. Figure 3c graphs the six events used along with the RIN
subsidy. As discussed in the main text, the policy announcements shifted industry expectations regarding
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whether the mandates would be above or below the blend wall and led to significant changes in RIN prices.
So long as the timing of the announcements is exogenous to E85 market conditions, changes in RIN prices
(conditional on ethanol and gasoline wholesale prices as well as our month-by-year or seasonality controls)
around the weeks following each announcement are valid instruments. The exogeneity of the timing of the
announcements is likely satisfied given that the enacting legislation and requirements to address stakeholder
comments guide the timing of the EPA’s announcements.
Table B.6 presents the estimated pass-through rates after six weeks for the two instrumental variables
strategies. The top panel shows the results instrumenting only for the contemporaneous subsidy and whole-
sale fuel prices. The bottom panel presents estimates for the specifications instrumenting for contemporane-
ous and lagged wholesale prices. We estimate the model in levels with and without seasonality controls and
month-by-year controls (columns 1-3), as well as in first differences with and without the seasonality and
month-by-year controls (columns 4-6).33 In all specifications, the instrument prices of crude oil and sugar are
specified in first differences. When we instrument only for the contemporaneous subsidy and wholesale fuel
costs, we include the contemporaneous and two lags of each instrument (including all policy announcement
indicators). When we instrument for the contemporaneous and lagged subsidy and wholesale fuel costs, we
include the contemporaneous and six lags of Brent and sugar futures prices and contemporaneous and three
lags of each policy announcement indicator as instruments. All standard errors are clustered by fuel station
and year-month and include a small sample adjustment of the covariance matrix. We report Kleibergen-Paap
F-statistics from the first stage regression at the bottom of each panel.
Results are similar to those in Table 2 when we instrument only for contemporaneous fuel prices. In all
specifications, F-statistics are indicative of strong instruments. We find that RIN prices are mostly passed
through to retail prices, with pass-through ranging between 78% and 94% after six weeks. Complete pass-
through cannot be rejected at a 5% level for any specification except for in column (1), where we include no
seasonality controls. The coefficients on ethanol and gasoline wholesale costs reflect their respective blend
rates in E85, particularly after controlling flexibly for seasonality in the levels specification or specifying all
variables in first differences. In addition, all estimated short-run dynamics are very similar to our previous
estimates.
Results are similar, albeit noisier, when we instrument for contemporaneous and all lagged values of
the subsidy and wholesale fuel costs as shown in the bottom panel of Table B.6. However, the first stage
F-statistics are notably lower, and the number of instrumented variables is large. Thus, the results should
be interpreted with caution and are offered as only suggestive that endogeneity is not a large concern in
our setting. This is not surprising given the small size of the E85 market. As the market continues to
grow, however, local shocks may play an increasingly important role in influencing upstream fuel costs and
invalidate our approach.
33Seasonality controls are indicator variables for the season of the year.
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Exploring heterogeneity in pass-through rates becomes more involved in an IV setting as the already large
number of endogenous variables in the regression grows even greater. Thus, to the extent that local demand
conditions affect upstream RIN, ethanol, and gasoline markets conditional on our controls, endogeneity may
remain a concern in our empirical results.
Asymmetric Pass-Through. Last, we consider whether retail E85 prices respond asymmetrically to
changes in the value of the upstream E85 subsidy as well as wholesale fuel costs. The extant literature has
found that such asymmetries play an important role in many retail fuel markets. To test this, we estimate
the following model:










t−j + γτ + it,
where,
∆X+t = max{0,∆Xt}, ∆X−t = min{0,∆Xt}.
Figure B.1 graphs the cumulative pass-through rates over time for decreases and increases in each price.
For both the E85 subsidy and ethanol cost increases and decreases, estimated dynamic pass-through rates
are nearly identical.34 Asymmetries do appear in wholesale gasoline cost pass-through for three to four weeks
after a cost shock, with cost decreases being passed through more quickly than cost decreases. The result
counters the previous literature and may be driven by noise in the data as evidenced by the large standard
errors. Overall, asymmetries do not appear to play a major role in our setting.
A.3 Resolving Differences with Knittel et al. (2015)
Knittel et al. (2015) (henceforth KMS) find full and immediate RIN pass-through to wholesale fuel prices;
however, the authors find little to no pass-through of the E85 subsidy retail E85 prices. In contrast to their
results, we find complete pass-through on average. In this section, we explore reasons for these differences.
We consider four reasons: (i) the specification of the dependent variable; (ii) the lag specification; (iii) the
regional sample selection; and (iv) the period over which the study is conducted.
KMS use average daily E85 and E10 prices reported by AAA. The authors specify the spread between
the two series as their dependent variable to control for wholesale prices. For comparison, we construct a
similar dependent variable by averaging the daily E85 prices reported by all stations in our data.35 We then
use the difference between our daily average E85 prices and AAA’s daily average U.S. gasoline price obtained
34We also estimated the model including an error correction term. Error correction models introduce nonlinearities in the
dynamic pass-through (Borenstein et al., 1997). Despite this, point estimates are similar to the first-differenced model presented
here, with increases and decreases for ethanol and the RIN subsidy being nearly equivalent.
35Some days involve taking the average of only a few prices. Despite this, the series is relatively smooth and follows very
closely with the average weekly price series in Figure 3d.
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from Bloomberg as our dependent variable. Thus, any differences in our empirical results should be driven
only by differences in the stations used to construct the daily average E85 price.
The main specification used in KMS estimates E85 subsidy pass-through using a daily price spread
between a national average E85 price and E10 price as their dependent variable. The E85 subsidy must,
therefore, be adjusted to reflect the net subsidy between E85 and E10, equal to τE85−τE10. The specification
has the advantage of focusing on retail price spreads that should control for wholesale price shocks.
We do not use this specification in our work for three reasons. First, models (3)-(5) have the advantage
of explicitly controlling for upstream wholesale prices and allow us to compare pass-through rates from the
E85 subsidy to pass-through rates of upstream ethanol and gasoline cost shocks. The specifications are also
more comparable to previous work studying impacts of wholesale gasoline and oil price shocks on retail fuel
prices (Borenstein et al., 1997; Lewis and Noel, 2011). Second, if there exist important lagged adjustments
of retail prices to upstream wholesale cost shocks (as we show there are), estimating pass-through based
on contemporaneous retail price spreads may not capture the lagged adjustment of prices to wholesale cost
shocks. Last, and more practically, many stations in Iowa continue to sell pure gasoline (E0) alongside E10.
While we have reported regular and mid-grade gas prices for all stations selling E85 in our sample, we are
unable to distinguish which series is E0 and which series is E10.
We first estimate CDM models similar to those estimated in KMS using the E85-E10 price spread as the
dependent variable. We also include specifications with the level of E85 prices with ethanol and gasoline
wholesale price controls to demonstrate the importance of controlling for dynamic adjustment of retail prices
to upstream wholesale costs. All specifications include the same seasonality controls used by KMS.36
Table B.7 presents estimates from the various specifications. All estimates are cumulative pass-through
rates after 15 and 35 days, or approximately two and five weeks. Column (1) presents estimates using the
same sample as was used by KMS with 15 lags. Column (2) uses the same period but includes 35 lags.
Columns (3) and (4) estimate the same two models but include data through 2016. Columns (5) and (6)
present the estimates most similar to our specification, allowing for 15 and 35 lags, respectively.
Column (1) corresponds most closely with the specification reported in Table 7 from Knittel et al. (2015).
Knittel et al. (2015) find an approximately 18% pass-through after 15 days. Our point estimate suggests an
even lower pass-through of 9%. Thus, the average E85 prices from our stations do not systematically exhibit
higher pass-through than those reported by AAA, i.e., our findings are not driven by sample selection in
using only Midwest E85 stations.
The estimated subsidy pass-through rate increased to 43% when 35 lags are included; however, standard
errors are large, and we cannot reject zero pass-through at conventional confidence levels. Columns (3)
36Specifically, seasonal controls are sines and cosines evaluated at the first four seasonal frequencies.
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and (4) include data through 2016 with 15 and 35 lags, respectively. Both point estimates are higher than
those from the previous columns, suggesting that the longer sample and more recent data exhibit higher
pass-through. When all data is included, we estimate a statistically significant 54% pass-through rate when
the longer adjustment period is considered, and cannot reject the null hypothesis of full pass-through at a
10% confidence level (p-value=0.07).
Columns (5) and (6) present the estimates using the level of E85 prices as the dependent variable with
controls for contemporaneous and lagged upstream ethanol and gasoline wholesale costs. Estimated pass-
through rates from all three series are small but statistically significant after 15 days. When 35 lags are
included, however, we find similar results as in our main specification with 88% pass-through of the E85
subsidy.
Overall the results suggest that the primary reasons for the differences in our results are the number of
lags considered, the extended sample period used in this study, and the empirical specification. The results
suggest that controlling for lagged adjustment, both for upstream wholesale costs as well as upstream RIN
values, is important when studying pass-through in the current setting.
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Table B.2: Stationarity and Cointegration Test Results
Retail E85 Prices
Fisher Inv. χ2 (Trend)
2 Lags 4 Lags 6 Lags
p-value 0.2389 0.339 0.9971
Fisher Inv. χ2 (Trend, Demeaned)
2 Lags 4 Lags 6 Lags
p-value <0.000 <0.000 0.8985
Station ADF (Trend)
2 Lags 4 Lags 6 Lags
% Reject 0.068 0.049 0.051
E85 Subsidy
ADF (Trend)
2 Lags 4 Lags 6 Lags
MacKinnon p-value 0.225 0.334 0.125
Wholesale Ethanol
ADF (Trend)
2 Lags 4 Lags 6 Lags
MacKinnon p-value 0.059 0.077 0.198
Wholesale Gasoline
ADF (Trend)
2 Lags 4 Lags 6 Lags
MacKinnon p-value 0.389 0.387 0.256
Station-Cointegration
Engle-Granger (Trend)
2 Lags 4 Lags 6 Lags
% Reject 0.052 0.048 0.009
The top panel presents panel and station-level unit root test results. P-values for the Fisher Inverse
χ2 panel unit root test combine ADF test statistics for all stations’ ADF tests. The null hypothesis
of the Fisher test is that all stations’ prices contain a unit root. The station ADF test present the
average 5% confidence level rejection rate of stations using an ADF test with the listed number
of lags. For E85, wholesale ethanol and wholesale gasoline, MacKinnon approximate p-values for
an ADF test with the listed number of lags are reported. The null hypothesis of all ADF tests
is that the series contains a unit root. The station-cointegration panel presents average rejection
rates of station-level Engle-Granger cointegration tests. The null hypothesis is that the series are
not cointegrated.
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Table B.3: E85 Subsidy Pass-Through: Evolution Over Time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
E85 Subsidy ($/gal) 0.872*** 0.718*** 0.925*** 0.914***
(0.157) (0.216) (0.150) (0.165)
Ethanol ($/gal) 0.620*** 0.915*** 0.709*** 0.945***
(0.066) (0.212) (0.079) (0.195)
Gasoline ($/gal) 0.377** 0.299*** 0.379* 0.364***
(0.181) (0.104) (0.194) (0.096)
Observations 8751 8962 8118 7795
Model CDM CDM CDM CDM
Specification FD FD FD FD
Period 2013-2014 2015-2016 2013-2014 2015-2016
Lags (Weeks) 6 6 8 8
The dependent variable is the first difference of retail E85 prices ($/gal). The esti-
mates are the cumulative dynamic multipliers for each variable after the specified
number of weeks. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are two-way
clustered at the station and year-by-month. *, **, *** denotes significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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Table B.4: E85 Subsidy Pass-Through: Reporting Weeks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
E85 Subsidy ($/gal) 0.888*** 0.682*** 0.962*** 0.831***
(0.129) (0.123) (0.132) (0.116)
Ethanol ($/gal) 0.604*** 0.763*** 0.705*** 0.854***
(0.071) (0.111) (0.078) (0.118)
Gasoline ($/gal) 0.376*** 0.296*** 0.385*** 0.305***
(0.102) (0.104) (0.110) (0.090)
Observations 12,071 5,642 11,307 4,606
Model CDM CDM CDM CDM
Specification FD FD FD FD
Lags (Weeks) 6 6 8 8
Station FE No No No No
YearXMonth FE No No No No
Reporting Data ≥2 Years <2 Years ≥2 Years <2 Years
The dependent variable is the retail E85 price ($/gal). The estimates are of the cu-
mulative dynamic multipliers for each variable after the number of lagged periods
specified in the bottom panel. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and are two-way clustered at the station and year-by-month. *, **, *** denotes
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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Table B.5: E85 Subsidy Pass-Through and Market Structure: Reporting Weeks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
E85 Subsidy ($/gal) 0.954*** 0.820*** 1.031*** 0.824*** 1.010*** 0.920***
(0.137) (0.118) (0.135) (0.155) (0.138) (0.121)
× (Branded Major) 0.111* 0.008
(0.061) (0.084)
× (> 5 mi. to E85 Station) -0.131*** 0.013
(0.041) (0.174)
× (> 10 mi. to E85 Station) -0.205*** -0.278
(0.050) (0.174)
Ethanol ($/gal) 0.701*** 0.891*** 0.749*** 0.918*** 0.737*** 0.901***
(0.080) (0.127) (0.091) (0.148) (0.083) (0.145)
× (Branded Major) 0.049 -0.487**
(0.078) (0.184)
× (> 5 mi. to E85 Station) -0.083** -0.139
(0.038) (0.083)
× (> 10 mi. to E85 Station) -0.133*** -0.181
(0.040) (0.263)
Gasoline ($/gal) 0.387*** 0.292*** 0.378*** 0.271** 0.382*** 0.286**
(0.113) (0.096) (0.118) (0.103) (0.111) (0.106)
× (Branded Major) -0.042 0.133
(0.045) (0.200)
× (> 5 mi. to E85 Station) 0.011 0.074
(0.035) (0.075)
× (> 10 mi. to E85 Station) 0.010 0.071
(0.017) (0.130)
Observations 11,307 4,606 11,307 4,606 11,307 4,606
Model CDM CDM CDM CDM CDM CDM
Specification FD FD FD FD FD FD
Lags (Weeks) 8 8 8 8 8 8
Reporting Data ≥2 Years <2 Years ≥2 Years <2 Years ≥2 Years <2 Years
The dependent variable is the first difference of the retail E85 price ($/gal). (Branded Major) is an indicator variable
for whether a station is affiliated with a large, vertically integrated oil company. (> 5 mi. to E85 Station) and (> 10 mi.
to E85 Station) are indicator variables that equal one if the closest rival station selling E85 is more than 5 (10) miles
away. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at the station and year-by-month. *,
**, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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Table B.6: E85 Subsidy Pass-Through: Instrumental Variables Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contemporaneous Values Endogenous
E85 Subsidy ($/gal) 0.762*** 0.791*** 0.918*** 0.804*** 0.798*** 0.893***
(0.070) (0.067) (0.239) (0.141) (0.137) (0.233)
Ethanol ($/gal) 0.857*** 0.881*** 0.730*** 0.737*** 0.746*** 0.723***
(0.078) (0.085) (0.088) (0.126) (0.116) (0.084)
Gasoline ($/gal) 0.275*** 0.257*** 0.348*** 0.312*** 0.302*** 0.336***
(0.040) (0.042) (0.125) (0.090) (0.093) (0.117)
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 20.164 24.415 31.050 210.730 53.456 40.631
Observations 18,722 18,722 18,722 17,713 17,713 17,713
Contemporaneous and Lagged Values Endogenous
E85 Subsidy ($/gal) 0.788*** 0.879*** 1.222*** 1.030*** 1.154*** 1.326***
(0.126) (0.130) (0.339) (0.232) (0.228) (0.400)
Ethanol ($/gal) 0.959*** 0.977*** 0.432 0.735*** 0.675*** 0.764***
(0.136) (0.134) (0.290) (0.206) (0.156) (0.248)
Gasoline ($/gal) 0.214*** 0.194** 0.601** 0.616** 0.581* 0.438
(0.075) (0.075) (0.281) (0.279) (0.331) (0.461)
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 4.419 2.610 23.571 14.341 14.257 1.763
Observations 17,705 17,705 17,705 16,780 16,780 16,780
Model CDM CDM CDM CDM CDM CDM
Specification Level Level Level FD FD FD
Lags (Weeks) 6 6 6 6 6 6
Station FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
YearXMonth FE No No Yes No No Yes
Seasonality Controls No Yes No No Yes No
The dependent variable is the retail E85 price ($/gal). The top panel presents estimates from our IV model assuming
only contemporaneous values are endogenous, and the bottom panel presents estimates from our IV model that assumes
all contemporaneous and lagged prices are endogenous. The CDM columns present estimates of the cumulative dynamic
multipliers for each variable after the number of lagged periods specified in the bottom panel. Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at the station and year-by-month. *, **, *** denotes significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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Table B.7: E85 Subsidy Pass-Through: Daily CDM Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable E85-E10 E85-E10 E85-E10 E85-E10 E85 E85
E85 Subsidy ($/gal) 0.093 0.429 0.123 0.537** 0.326*** 0.884***
(0.135) (0.328) (0.140) (0.257) (0.109) (0.163)
Ethanol ($/gal) 0.406*** 0.668***
(0.068) (0.078)
Gasoline ($/gal) 0.403*** 0.347***
(0.086) (0.116)
Observations 524 504 843 824 853 833
Lags (Days) 15 35 15 35 15 35
Period KMS KMS Full Full Full Full
The table presents estimates of the cumulative dynamic multipliers for each variable after the number of
lagged days specified in the bottom panel. Standard errors are Newey-West with 30 lags. All specifications
include seasonality controls as in KMS. The ‘KMS’ period is 1/1/2013-3/10/2015 and the ‘Full’ period is
1/1/2013-6/30/2016. Differences in observations across specifications arise due to differences in lag structures
and due to availability of AAA average gasoline price, which we have only through 6/1/2016. *, **, and ***
denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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Note: The figure graphs the average speed with which a shock to the upstream E85 subsidy, wholesale ethanol price, and
wholesale gasoline price are reflected in retail E85 prices. The coefficients are estimated separately for increases and decreases
in each cost variable. All cost shocks occur in week 0.
